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ABSTRACT 
Stakeholder theory may be the Archimedes lever that allows defining a possible 
Economy for the Common Good; however, the theory’s current level of development 
does not enable it to escape the criticism that considers it nothing more than shared 
egotism. The expansion of the concept of stakeholder, including not only groups that 
collaborate in the creation of value or which are actively impacted by the organisation, 
but also incorporating those affected by omission –non-stakeholders- would lead to the 
reconciliation of stakeholder theory and the common good. Nevertheless, to set it within 
corporate practice, besides having selfish and altruist incentives, would be of interest for 
the conceptual development of shapeholders, understood as the link between non-
stakeholders’ interests and needs, and firms. 
KEYWORDS: Economy for the Common Good, Stakeholder Theory, Bottom of the 
pyramid, corporate purpose, Shapeholders. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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While understandably desirable, the Economy for the Common Good (Argandoña, 
1998; Daly & Cobb, 1989) may well be a pipe dream from both a theoretical and a 
practical perspective. Within the theoretical ambit, it is simply a redundancy, as all 
economic theories focus on the common good, and in practice there is more than 
enough evidence from the past several thousand years to prove how impossible it is for 
people from different cultures, worldviews, geographical areas and social conditions to 
even agree on the very nature of the common good, and much less so on the type of 
economy that may lead us toward it.  
Within this context, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) has the virtue of encapsulating 
this good in the satisfaction of the interests of people involved in an organisation 
(Retolaza, Ruiz-Roqueñi & San-Jose, 2015), whereby the common good passes from an 
abstract topic of discussion to a practical embodiment with “face and eyes”. It is true 
that stakeholder theory is very broad and also ambiguous in its approach, giving rise to 
sundry lines of interpretation, which could be summarised in four main ones (San-Jose 
& Retolaza, 2012): the positive one, referring to what firms actually do; the 
instrumental one, centred on the stakeholders that contribute value for the firm; the 
normative one, focusing on the organisation’s responsibility to all those people affected 
by it (Donaldson & Preston, 1995); and the ontological one, where the firm is seen as a 
network of stakeholders that share resources in order to create and receive value. In the 
case of the latter two perspectives, the normative and ontological ones, the organisation 
is responsible for satisfying the interests of all the stakeholders engaged with the 
organisation, and it should therefore contribute to the common good of all those people 
involved. This approach may provide a link between stakeholder theory and the 
economy for the common good, which is precisely what this chapter sets out to do.  
Nevertheless, there is a major objection, namely, the possibility that the common good 
is reduced to the more or less extensive group of the organisation’s stakeholders, with a 
negative impact on people outside the organisation, who are not considered 
stakeholders. Accordingly, we believe that a broader interpretation of the concept of 
stakeholder, which would include the rights of the overall population, and especially the 
inclusion of those affected by omission, that is, non-stakeholders, would enable 
stakeholder theory to become a path that would allow defining the alignment of 
organisations with the common good. 
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Yet the problem may not end here, as one might well ask why firms, which sometimes 
do not even concern themselves with critical stakeholders in value creation, should even 
try to respond to the needs and interests of non-stakeholders. This consideration can be 
broken down into three different approaches that may complement each other: 1) an 
instrumental one, reflected in the perspective of “the bottom of the pyramid”, where the 
concern for non-stakeholders stems from their future potential for creating value for the 
organisation; 2) the altruistic one, linked to the corporate purpose, with clear 
connections with social entrepreneurship; and 3) the shapeholders approach, in which 
people, organisations and institutions with no direct legitimate interest of their own in 
the firm represent the legitimate interests of non-stakeholders. 
It would therefore be possible to conclude that stakeholder theory, either in its 
normative approach or through firm theory–ontological-, seasoned with a mixture of 
egotism (bottom of the pyramid), altruism (purpose), and internal/external pressure 
(shapeholders) might be a practical approach that would allow defining the “common 
good” in organisations, and by extension in the economy as a whole.  
 
LIMITS ON THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE ECONOMY FOR THE 
COMMON GOOD 
To refer to an Economy for the Common Good is a redundancy, as any economic model 
by definition seeks the common good. There is not a single economic theory that 
champions common “harm”, not even the pursuit of individual advantage that causes 
collective disadvantage. All significant economic theories refer to the common good
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and seek to contribute to it. From Adam Smith, with his “invisible hand”, to any one of 
today’s economic theoreticians, passing through Marshall, who kept a photo of a 
disadvantaged child on the desk in his office to remind him who the economy should 
serve, the concern has been about how the economy should contribute to general 
wellbeing. Thus, economic theories do not so much differ in their purpose as in the way 
they aim to achieve that wellbeing, and especially in the anthropological and 
sociological circumstances upon which their normative proposal is based.  
                                                          
1
 In Western thought, the concept of “Common Good” has had mixed fortune; it took pride of place in the 
thinking of Aristotle and, in due course, that of Thomas Aquinas; following the Enlightenment’s move 
toward individualism, the concept became redundant and almost disappeared as a unitary concept in the 
last century’s relativist and multicultural currents; or in the best of cases it was consigned to the field of 
theology (Moltmann, 1968). 
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In a simplified manner, we may single out four separate economic approaches: a market 
economy, a planned economy, a social economy, and non-profit economic activity, 
although the reality is that these forms constitute hybrids with a larger or smaller 
component of each one of the four models proposed.  
When we refer to the common good in relation to the economy, we are not only 
considering the third sector, or non-profit organisations, but instead, and consistent with 
the encyclical Caritas in Veritate (Benedict XVI, 2009, n. 46) we are dealing with “a 
broad new composite reality embracing the public and private spheres, one which does 
not exclude profit but instead considers it a means for achieving human and social 
ends”. 
Following Argandoña (2011a: 3), “the common good is the good of society and its 
members; as it is common it cannot be simply the good of some, not even of the 
majority, but instead the good of each and every one of them, at the same time and for 
the same concept: the good in which they all participate as members of the same 
society…”. Amongst other authors, special note should be taken of Zamagni (2007: 23), 
who affirms, for example, that “The common good is… the good of the relations 
themselves between people, bearing in mind that such relations are understood a good 
for all those who participate in them”. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that all the 
members of a diversified community will have the same understanding of what their 
common good is. It therefore seems difficult to identify certain specific ends that can be 
associated with that common good. 
Along these lines, the achievement of the common good in the economy has followed 
two antagonistic trends; on the one hand, an individualist one, and on the other, a 
collectivist one, and perhaps somewhere in the middle there is a compromise that may 
well be the one that most closely identifies with the “European welfare state” in 
macroeconomic terms (Harrison, 2013; Argandoña, 1998; 2011a)
2
, and with a social 
economy on a microeconomic level. We are now fully aware of the contradictions 
between the concept of “common good” and the neoliberal economic approach, 
especially with regard to inequality and the environment (Piketty, 1995); yet no less 
important are the problems involving the common good as an economic horizon. 
                                                          
2
 1) A community model, which is undoubtedly related to a Marxist economy, and with the totalitarian 
experiences of the mid-20
th
 century; 2) a model with a utilitarian approach, closely related to a neo-liberal 
view of the economy; 3) a deontological model, associated with the value of “justice”. 
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Leaving aside the failed experience of a planned economy, we can identify at least five 
major problems in the use of the “common good” as a theoretical framework or core 
idea (Deneulin, 2006):  
1) The common good understood as merely an instrumental concept of the individual 
good, which would be considered an ultimate aim. 
2) In those cases in which it is not instrumental, it runs the risk of becoming an 
instrument for different forms of totalitarianism, with history being full of examples 
of this kind. 
3) In the welfare state, “common good” is often used as a synonym for public assets.  
4) When the aim is to be more specific and reach a consensus, it is normally reduced 
to a list of human rights or the resources required for improving “quality of life”. 
5) It is, nonetheless, an unrealisable concept, as it is impossible to reach an 
agreement in a multicultural society, except between those who share the same 
premises, as in the case of Social Contracts Theory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), 
which largely amounts to a tautology. 
We may thus resort to the terminology used by Wittgenstein (1958), whereby the 
“common good” is an interesting topic in terms of its connotative value, but is 
meaningless in denotative terms, especially if one wishes to apply it to the economy; 
and its meaningless suggests that it is best not to use it. 
Following this line of reasoning, it would seem that none of the classical approaches 
enables us to increase its area of intersection with the “common good”. Insofar as the 
individualist approach is concerned, the common good is identified with the general 
interest, and is determined by consensus as the sum of private goods chosen by each 
individual based on their utility function. It is therefore an ethics based on hedonism, 
the greatest good for the highest number of people (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012). This 
standpoint is closely linked to a neoliberal view of the economy (Harrison, 2013), and 
more generally, to the political-philosophical concept of liberalism (Nozick, 1988). The 
key value idea is provided by the paradoxical binomial of freedom and market forces.  
The community model that has been amply developed in past centuries considers that a 
community is much more than a collection of individuals, and it becomes a moral space 
in which things have value insofar as the prevailing culture gives them meaning. It 
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therefore involves the communal good, and not the good of people as members of the 
individual community. The key problem with this model lies in the fact it drifts toward 
totalitarian approaches, such as those developed in the last century: Nazism, 
Communism, Fascism, etc. 
One of the developments of this approach involves welfare liberalism, which is based 
on the individualist assumptions of liberalism, but it is pointed out that people, by 
seeking to pursue their life project within the ambit of the free market, have to cope 
with very different starting points. It is the task of the State (ethically neutral, as in 
philosophical liberalism) to uphold that equality, ensuring and fairly distributing the 
freedoms and resources that individuals require for leading the lives they have freely 
chosen for themselves. This model includes the value of “justice” as a mechanism for 
compensating the imbalances caused by initial inequalities and the circumstantial and 
structural failures of market forces (Rawls, 1971). 
The centrality of the justice value gives rise to an alternative model, where the 
“common good” is identified with the sum of resources required for people to live their 
lives to their full potential, with these resources being expressed as human rights. This 
gives rise to models such as the capabilities approach (Sen, 1999) or the deontological 
model (Nussbaum, 1992). These models juxtapose the values of justice and freedom, 
and although they are included within a Market Economy, they interpret its fundaments 
in significantly different ways. 
The key problem with all these models as regards the common good is that they are 
either incapable of identifying a “common good”, or the supposed “common good” they 
propose is not commonly accepted by all the individuals involved. The impression is 
that however much one might reinforce the semantics or generate new terms, the 
underlying problem remains unsolved. One should not dismiss the need for dialogue 
between different ideologies in order to reach consensuses regarding the common good 
with growing acceptance, or the fact that the globalisation of communications may 
favour these convergence processes. Our proposal involves exploring an alternative 
scenario in the understanding of “common good”. This scenario, instead of a macro 
perspective, referring to Society or the economy, focuses on a specific firm or 
organisation, adopting a micro-economic and micro-social approach. The paradigm that 
might provide support for this development is stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman et al., 2010), which considers that a firm or organisation should create value, 
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in a balanced manner, for the sum of its stakeholders, understanding these to be all the 
people that may have an influence on the organisation in question or, in turn, be 
influenced by it. 
 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY AS THE REALISATION OF THE ECONOMY FOR 
THE COMMON GOOD 
The question we should ask at this point is as follows: why is it that if in a firm not only 
the shareholders but also a series of players contribute to the creation of value and 
assume residual risk, it is considered that the only ones with legitimate rights to decide 
upon the residual profit are the holders of the capital? It would seem logical that the 
firm’s remit should be to satisfy the interests of all those people involved in the creation 
of value or the assumption of risk. The answer is simple, there is a theory on property 
rights that provides the necessary backing whereby the legal systems in virtually all 
countries consider shareholders to be the firm’s owners, regardless of the true 
contribution they make to its value, or of the percentage of risk they assume. 
Within this context, stakeholder theory is understood as firm theory, that is, as an 
explanation or basis for the firm’s existence, and not a mere instrumental, descriptive, or 
even normative theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), whereby it is a truly ontological 
theory within the corporate ambit (San-Jose & Retolaza, 2012). 
From this perspective, and according to Wieland (2011: 227) “the nature of the firm can 
then be determined as a contractual nexus of stakeholder resources and stakeholder 
interests, whose function lies in the governance, namely, the leadership, management 
and monitoring of the resource owners, with the aim of economic value creation and the 
distribution of an economic rent”. In other words, the firm, and the approach could be 
extended to other kinds of organisations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) and would aim to 
satisfy the interests not only of shareholders, but of all its stakeholders. Along these 
lines, we propose extending Wieland’s approach in two directions; on the one hand, 
value added should not simply be financial, as the stakeholders involved in an 
organisation may have a series of broader and more diverse interests than mere financial 
gain (Argandoña, 2011a); and on the other, we could consider a more extended 
description of stakeholders, including not only those that provide resources– those that 
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“affect” according to the terminology used by Freeman (1984) and Freeman et al. 
(2008), but also those that are affected by the organisation. 
Based on the above premises, we have replaced the good of shareholders with the good 
of stakeholders across the board, and in turn we have broadened the concept of good, 
overcoming its economicist reduction. Nevertheless, should we understand that this 
inclusion of all stakeholders may be considered a common good? Not necessarily, 
because what we have actually done is transfer the initial problem of relativism in our 
understanding of the common good within the socio-economic ambit to the 
microeconomic sphere, but we have still not resolved it. It is within this sphere, 
however, that we encounter two differential characteristics, as opposed to the previous 
ambit of discussion, with one being the closer proximity of the players involved, and the 
other being the limited nature of the interests in play. 
 
OVERCOMING THE LIMITS OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY IN RELATION 
TO THE COMMON GOOD  
Can stakeholder theory be used for considering an approach to the common good in 
organisations? Perhaps it can, replacing an individualist perspective by a cooperative 
one.  
As we have seen, the utilitarian perspective, with a clearly atomising approach, 
considers that individual wishes and interests are the sole reason for interacting with 
others (Harrison & Strassmann, 1989; Harrison, 2002). According to the idealised 
neoclassical viewpoint, individuals only pursue their own interests, negating or ignoring 
the existence of truly significant relations between people. This approach entails the 
centrality of the approach as the leitmotif for any organisation, and leads to the creation 
of a false antithesis between self-interest and altruism. 
From this perspective, which we may define as an atomised one of self-interest, 
utilitarian or with several other meanings, stakeholder theory is simply a way of 
extending the conflict of interests, as we raise those conflicts regulated on a contractual 
basis –conflict between major players-, to a primary position. The main consequence of 
this would be greater conflict within an organisation, as illustrated by both 
“Goodpaster’s paradox” (1991) and Jensen’s “problem of governance” (2002; 2008). 
From this standpoint, finding the “Common Good” will be impossible, unless we adopt 
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a pragmatic perspective (Dewey, 1916) or a utilitarian one (Mill, 2010) to consider it 
under the prism of a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
3
 (1939), looking upon it as the best 
combination for obtaining utilities by the sum of agents involved –also including, in a 
broad sense, those affected. 
Nevertheless, the outcome would seem to be nothing more than a conflict between the 
parties, where in the interest of results [instrumental], justice [normative], or the value 
created [ontological] (San-Jose & Retolaza, 2012; Retolaza, Ruiz-Roqueñi & San-Jose, 
2015), we empower to a greater or lesser extent all stakeholders in detriment to 
shareholders, while accepting the basic premise that each one will strive to satisfy their 
own interests. 
Nonetheless, the main limitation noted as regarding the siting of stakeholder theory 
within the framework of the “common good” paradigm is the assumption that the 
different stakeholders in an organisation may have egocentric, or even illegitimate, 
interests, whose satisfaction does not involve any advancement of society at large 
(Garriga & Mele, 2013). The response to this objection may head in three 
complementary directions, on the one hand, 1) understanding stakeholder theory from a 
collaborative anthropological perspective; on the other, 2) the extension of the 
boundaries, encompassing both non-stakeholders and true stakeholders, and if not 
belonging to a specific firm, then pertaining to an industry or type of firm; and finally, 
3) reflecting upon the mechanisms that permit driving the view that it is a firm’s 
                                                          
3
 A Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency (1939) is a type of economic efficiency that occurs solely when the 
economic value of social resources is optimised. A Kaldor-Hicks improvement is any option that 
increases the value of social resources. The notion is related to Pareto improvements. According to a 
Pareto improvement, an outcome is more efficient if at least one person is better off while no one else is 
worse off. According to a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a more efficient result may leave some people worse 
off. Here, a result is more efficient when those who are better off could in theory compensate for those 
who are worse off and lead to a Pareto optimality outcome. While all Pareto efficient situations are also 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, the reverse is not true; along these same lines, although each Pareto improvement 
is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, most Kaldor-Hicks improvements are not Pareto improvements. The 
Kaldor and Hicks methods are typically used as tests of efficiency, being typically applied to decide 
whether an activity is moving the economy towards Pareto efficiency. Generally speaking, any change 
leads to some people being better and makes other people worse off, so this approach poses the question 
of what would happen if the winners compensated the losers. According to the Kaldor criterion, an 
activity would contribute to Pareto optimality if the maximum amount those better off would be willing to 
pay is greater than the minimum amount those worse off would demand in compensation. According to 
the Hicks criterion, an activity would contribute to the Pareto optimal if the maximum amount that those 
worse off are willing to pay those potentially better off in order to avoid the change is less than the 
minimum amount those potentially better off are willing to accept to reject the change. The test of Hicks 
remuneration takes the point of view of those worse off, while the test of Kaldor remunerations adopts the 
standpoint of those better off. If these two conditions are met, both those better off and those worse off 
may agree that the proposed activity will dynamise the economy toward the Pareto optimal. 
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responsibility to cater for the needs and interests of its more disadvantaged stakeholders, 
and therefore the ones with the least power of influence. 
As regards the first line, it should be noted that there is another interpretation of work 
and business that is not necessarily individualistic, emphasising the connections and 
interdependence among people. As people, we are both individualities and dialoguing 
beings that construct our own personas through interactions with others (Levinas, 1979; 
amongst others). Aristotle (1159, b25) saw friendship as a particularly important force 
in the articulation of the polis, and there are myriad studies in the sciences that stress the 
cooperative nature of human beings. An experimental study published recently in 
Nature (Rand et al., 2012) highlights the fact that people instinctively react in a 
cooperative manner; other authors (Seligman et al., 2005) stress that the happiest 
people, and even the most successful ones, are the ones who do not focus on their own 
personal interests. 
Accordingly, together with the consideration of stakeholder theory as firm theory 
(stakeholder ontological theory), the common good in a firm requires replacing the 
individualistic anthropological approach, typical of a neoliberal economy, with another 
dialogical one that recognises that the core value for people is founded on the 
relationship with the other, and not on the mere enjoyment of material goods. As 
Fromm affirmed in 1976 in “To Have or To Be” we should make the transition from a 
logic of having –material goods- to a logic of being –relationship with other people and 
the environment. This is precisely the line of thinking that provides the framework for 
the new works by Freeman & Ginena (2015) in their approach involving “creative 
capitalism” and putting a relational perspective before a transactional one. 
 
INCORPORATING RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD NON-STAKEHOLDERS 
Concerning the issue of non-stakeholders, it is true that their existence questions the 
ability organisations have to respond to their interests; nevertheless, this matter has a 
solution if we once again extend the concept of stakeholders, understanding them to be 
not only those players that provide value for a firm (a restricted view, normally linked 
to an instrumental perspective), and not even those affected by a firm’s operations, but 
instead considering as such those persons that the sum of firms or organisations within a 
specific industry are unable to cater for, so we would be referring to those affected by 
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omission. Taking financial institutions as an example, we could indicate that there is an 
initial consideration of the stakeholder as a value creator; according to this perspective, 
each institution in particular will have to concern itself about its customers, suppliers, 
employees, funders and shareholders; both because they have a moral responsibility 
toward them and because they are essential for the business’s proper operation. 
Extending this perspective, they will also have some kind of responsibility toward those 
customers in default, as regardless of whether or not these are capable of creating value 
for the institution, they will be affected by the decisions it may make regarding the 
execution of the guarantees or the loans themselves; it will be the institution’s 
responsibility to ensure the best possible outcome for them. Yet there is a still a third 
step, let us consider financial exclusion; for several reasons, a significant number of 
people in developed countries, and a great many more elsewhere, are excluded from the 
financial system. Consequently, they cannot be considered stakeholders, in the 
traditional sense, of any institution; nevertheless, it would seem that financial 
institutions as a whole should in some way respond to the problem, considering 
channels for the financial inclusion of these people. This approach, related to the 
concept of “corporate citizenship” (Neron, 2008), would be fairly close to the specific 
consideration of the “common good”, in the sense that the concern for stakeholders 
would extend to a concern for including non-stakeholders as stakeholders, and thereby 
responding to their legitimate interests. 
This approach has been followed in Spain in the case of car insurance, where someone 
who holds no interest for any company, and would not therefore be considered a 
stakeholder for any one of them, is able to arrange an insurance policy, managed by the 
sector as a whole, as it is not deemed socially acceptable to have people driving without 
compulsory third-party insurance. It would seem that problems such as the financial 
exclusion mentioned earlier and the exclusion from healthcare or medication would 
require solutions along these lines. The Sustainable Development Goals approved at the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Summit 2015 
(http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/), designed to engage not only global 
leaders but also businesses, seem to head in this direction, as it would be a collective 
responsibility to eradicate  poverty (goal 1), hunger (goal 2) and inequality (goal 10). 
 
12 
 
MECHANISMS FOR INCORPORATING THE INTERESTS OF NON-
STAKEHOLDERS 
As regards this new perspective that combines stakeholder theory and the “common 
good” through the link of the non-stakeholder, we now need to reflect upon the forces 
that permit the mobilisation of organisations in this direction. The bulk of major 
corporations (over 75% according to Agle, 2008) have already mobilised in an attempt 
to respond to those stakeholders that are instrumental for value creation, as well as to 
cater for those stakeholders they affect through their operations (Escudero & Garcia, 
2014); however, some doubt remains over how they will be able to mobilise themselves 
to reach out to non-stakeholders, when the latter have no capacity for creating value or 
for exerting pressure on these organisations. Following this train of thought, we could 
identify three complementary approaches: 1) a rational or instrumental one, in which the 
integration of non-stakeholders is seen as a potential benefit for a firm, 2) a finalist one, 
linked to the corporate purpose, 3) and one of intermediation, mainly through 
shapeholders. 
As regards the first approach, we encounter what Hahn (2009) calls the ethical rationale 
of business, defined by the fact that ethics and business go hand-in-hand; what is 
ethical, moreover, is good for the firm from an economic-financial perspective. Along 
these lines, and as regards non-stakeholders, the main proposal would be the bottom of 
the pyramid (Prahalad, 2005), whose core notion is that the integration of the “world’s 
poorest people” into the business value chain, either as customers, suppliers, retailers, 
etc., is simultaneously useful for improving business opportunities and reducing long-
term poverty. In this approach, although it is true that non-stakeholders cannot be 
considered potential customers, as the current cost structure does not provide for their 
inclusion within the value chain, a proper realignment of the processes of production 
and value appropriation would pave the way for their gradual integration. Besides the 
criticisms, which mainly concern the true potential of non-stakeholders as a market 
(Karnani, 2005), doubts over the integration-consumption binomial, or the need for 
public-private cooperation to develop this strategy, the truth is that the instrumental 
approach as regards the inclusion of both stakeholders and non-stakeholders is exerting 
a major influence on the argument within the framework of stakeholder theory, as well 
as on related approaches, such as corporate social responsibility and corporate 
citizenship. 
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The second perspective of integration would be an altruist approach, linked to corporate 
purpose. The purpose, or mission, of a large number of organisations is to fully or 
partially contribute to social wellbeing, and so the gradual extension of their services or 
products to people outside their initial target is simply a ramification of their own 
business approach. Although it is true that this is readily apparent in non-profit 
organisations, those firms linked to social learning, or which operate within the ambit of 
the social and solidarity economy, it is no less true that many trading companies, which 
are assumed to have the quest for profit as their basic leitmotif, have a higher purpose, 
normally of a social nature. The B Corps (https://www.bcorporation.net) are a good 
example of this approach. Both seminal studies (Collins & Porras, 1996) and modern 
ones (Kenny, 2014) comment on the importance of corporate purpose, and their 
connection both with values and ethics and with value creation for society. Purposes 
such as those of the companies listed in Table 1 speak for themselves about the potential 
for linking to the common good and open up to non-stakeholders.  
Table 1. Corporate purposes. 
COMPANY PURPOSE 
3M To solve unsolved problems innovatively 
Cargill To improve the standard of living around the world 
Fannie Mae To strengthen the social fabric by continually democratizing home 
ownership 
Hewlett-Packard To make technical contributions for the advancement and welfare of 
humanity 
Lost Arrow Corporation To be a role model and a tool for social change 
Pacific Theatres To provide a place for people to flourish and to enhance the 
community 
Telecare Corporation To help people with mental impairments realize their full potential 
Wal-Mart To give ordinary folk the chance to buy the same things as rich 
people 
Walt Disney To make people happy 
Source: own elaboration from Collins & Porras (1996: 69). 
 
It would thus appear that corporate purpose may provide a major link between a 
company and the common good, which has the added characteristic of being self-
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imposed, and therefore voluntary, and to a large extent altruistic. In this same vein, it 
may be stressed that the key difference between traditional banking and ethical banking 
in Europe lies in their purposes (Cowton, 2002; San Jose et al., 2011) developed 
through the concept of affinity. 
In keeping with the above, we may posit that firms and organisations have two major 
mechanisms for connecting with the common good through stakeholder theory; one is 
more instrumental or self-serving, focusing on the organisation’s own value, while the 
other is more altruistic, informed by corporate purpose. Both may be perfectly 
complementary for the ultimate purpose that concerns us here, a firm’s social function 
and the centrality of the common good in its operations (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Meso level of the organization focus on Society. 
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2
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SHAPEHOLDER: 
Connectors between the 
company and its 
stakeholders
3
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Source. Own elaboration 
The main shapeholders would be organisations with global operations, with which we 
have furnished ourselves as citizens precisely so that firms may contribute to the 
common good through a three-pronged approach: people, planet and profit. These 
institutions would act as a link between corporations and excluded people, and they are 
the ones that respond directly to the concern we have addressed, namely, the connection 
between firms and the common good through stakeholder theory. Nevertheless, there 
are also shapeholders that provide a link between organisations and some of their 
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acknowledged stakeholders; for example, within the field of shareholders, there are 
proxy advisors, who have the role of connectors, facilitating the understanding of 
information and generating trust. Likewise, within the field of non-personalised 
stakeholders, albeit widely acknowledged in the literature, there is the environment and 
future generations, which call for shapeholders, as neither of these two stakeholders is 
capable of directly defending its own rights and interests, which means someone’s 
intermediation is required to safeguard them and act as a link between a firm and its 
socio-environmental impact. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
First, it should be stressed that an organisation is an ambit for the definition and 
foundation of the “common good”, as opposed to the atomised perspective based on 
individualism or the collective one geared towards society at large. 
Second, mention should be made of the potential of stakeholder theory, from both a 
normative and ontological perspective –understanding the essence or nature of a 
business- to relate to the perspective of the “common good”, without the need to 
propose a break with capitalism. 
Third, it should be noted that stakeholder theory per se does not necessarily pursue the 
common good; in fact, if this to happen, it will require the incorporation of a dialogical 
and social view of people, considering the organisation to be something more than the 
sum of individuals, and considering the existence of a wide range of rents, and not just 
economic ones. In sum, it should be understood mainly from a relational and non-
transactional perspective. 
Fourth, there is a need to overcome the restrictions of stakeholder theory itself through 
the inclusion of those affected by omission, or non-stakeholders, into the entire group of 
stakeholders for which an organisation is responsible, either individually or on a joint 
and several basis–together with organisations in the sector. 
Fifth, special note should be taken of the complementarity that instrumental 
motivations, such as the bottom of the pyramid, and altruistic ones, such as social 
learning or corporate citizenship, may have on the road to defining the common good 
through the practical development of stakeholder theory. 
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Finally, emphasis needs to be placed on the role that may be played by shapeholders, 
understood as stakeholders that do not represent their own interests, but instead the 
legitimate interests of excluded third parties, as the ones providing firms and 
organisations with the incentive to realign their operations to include the interests of 
non-stakeholders, those who are excluded (“los nadies” – the nobodies, in the words of 
the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano -1940-). 
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